Annotating affective neuroscience data with the Emotion Ontology by Hastings, Janna et al.
Annotating affective neuroscience data with the Emotion Ontology
Janna Hastings 1,2∗, Werner Ceusters 3, Kevin Mulligan 4 and Barry Smith 5
1Cheminformatics and Metabolism, European Bioinformatics Institute, Cambridge, UK
2Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Switzerland
3Department of Psychiatry and National Center for Ontological Research, University at Buffalo, USA
4Department of Philosophy and Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, University of Geneva, Switzerland
5Department of Philosophy and National Center for Ontological Research, University at Buffalo, USA
ABSTRACT
The Emotion Ontology is an ontology covering all aspects of emo-
tional and affective mental functioning. It is being developed following
the principles of the OBO Foundry and Ontological Realism. This
means that in compiling the ontology, we emphasize the importance
of the nature of the entities in reality that the ontology is descri-
bing. One of the ways in which realism-based ontologies are being
successfully used within biomedical science is in the annotation of
scientific research results in publicly available databases. Such anno-
tation enables several objectives, including searching, browsing and
cross-database data integration. A key benefit conferred by realism-
based ontology is that suitably annotated research results are able
to be aggregated and compared in a fashion that is based on the
underlying reality that the science is studying. This has the potential
of increasing the power of statistical analysis and meta-analysis in
data-driven science. This aspect has been fruitfully exploited in the
investigation of the functions of genes in molecular biology.
Cognitive neuroscience uses functional neuroimaging to investi-
gate the brain correlates of areas of mental functioning such as
memory, planning and emotion. The use of functional neuroimaging
to study affective phenomena such as the emotions is called ‘affective
neuroscience’. BrainMap is the largest curated database of coordi-
nates and metadata for studies in cognitive neuroscience, including
affective neuroscience (Laird et al., 2005). BrainMap data is already
classified and indexed using a terminology for classification, called
the ‘Cognitive Paradigm Ontology’ (CogPO), that has been develo-
ped to facilitate searching and browsing. However, CogPO has been
developed specifically for the BrainMap database, and the data are
thus far not annotated to a realism-based ontology which would allow
the discovery of interrelationships between research results across
different databases on the basis of what the research is about. In
this contribution, we describe ongoing work that aims to annotate
affective neuroscience data, starting with the BrainMap database,
using the Emotion Ontology. We describe our objectives and technical
approach to the annotation, and mention some of the challenges.
1 INTRODUCTION
Research in affective science faces the need to integrate results
obtained on the basis of subjective reports with those obtained
through different sorts of scientific experimentation, and to compare
results across disciplines. Even within each discipline and metho-
dological paradigm, data are distributed across multiple databases
and the primary literature. Efforts to harmonize the schemas and
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vocabularies used to describe such data have thus far not been very
successful (Derrfuss and Mar, 2009).
Currently, therefore, it is impossible to automatically retrieve and
reconcile data relevant to a given research question across multiple
data sources. Such integration depends on the existence of (1) a sha-
red, disambiguated and clear reference terminology for the domain
(Frijda and Scherer, 2009; Scherer, 2005), and (2) a realism-based
reference ontology that provides a formal description for how terms
in the terminology relate to entities in reality (Smith and Ceusters,
2010). To address this requirement, we are developing the Emo-
tion Ontology, a specialization of the Mental Functioning Ontology
(MF, Hastings et al. (2012). MF is an overarching modular domain
ontology that aims to represent all aspects of mental functioning,
including mental processes such as thinking and mental qualities
such as intelligence. It is based on the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO)
(Grenon and Smith, 2004) and is being developed in the context of
the OBO Foundry (Smith et al., 2007), following the principles of
Ontological Realism (Smith and Ceusters, 2010).
Ontologies are widely used for database annotation to enable sea-
rching, browsing and cross-database integration (Stevens and Lord,
2009; Smith et al., 2007). A key benefit conferred by realism-
based ontology is that suitably annotated research results are able
to be aggregated and compared in a fashion that is based on the
underlying reality that the science is studying. This has the poten-
tial of increasing the power of statistical analysis and meta-analysis
in data-driven science, an aspect that has been particularly fruitful
in the investigation of the functions of genes in molecular biology
(Azuaje et al., 2006; Hill et al., 2008). We believe that the annota-
tion of research results in affective neuroscience with the Emotion
Ontology will similarly yield the potential for novel ontology-based
analysis methods to be developed. This contribution describes our
ongoing efforts towards realizing this objective.
The remainder of this introduction gives an overview of the Emo-
tion Ontology and the BrainMap database for which annotations
are initially being proposed. Thereafter, in our Methods section,
we describe the structure of the proposed ontology annotations,
present a synopsis of the experimental methods used in affective
neuroscience investigations, and describe how these will be used to
determine the ontology type to which results are annotated. Finally,
we highlight some open issues.
1.1 The Emotion Ontology
The Emotion Ontology (MFO-EM) is a module that extends the
Mental Functioning Ontology (MF) with representations of those
types that belong to the domain of emotions and, more broadly,
affective phenomena. Figure 1 illustrates the upper levels of the
ontology beneath relevant MF and BFO entities. Definitions of core
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terms are reproduced in the figure, but for reasons of space the
interested reader is referred to (Hastings et al., 2011) for a fuller
description of the ontology structure and core terms.
Each aspect of the ontology from this upper level is then develo-
ped further with specific subtypes annotated and defined beneath
them. Table 1 shows representative lower levels for some of the
entities in the ontology. For example, specific subtypes of ‘emo-
tion occurrent’ include ‘anger’ and ‘grief’; specific subtypes of
‘subjective emotional feeling’ include ‘feeling in control’ and ‘fee-
ling energetic’; specific subtypes of ‘appraisal’ include ‘appraisal of
dangerousness’ and ‘appraisal of pleasantness’.
Table 1. Example expanded subtypes of upper level entities ‘emotion
occurrent’, ‘subjective emotional feeling’ and ‘appraisal’
Emotion types such as fear show enormous variance across insta-
nces, just as do anatomical types such as ear or jaw. Realism-based
ontologies represent what is always the case. Thus, much of what
is known about the different emotion types cannot be straightforw-
ardly expressed in these ontologies, since they do not always occur
in every emotion instance of that type. Not all persons experiencing
fear have fearful facial expressions, not all instances of fear cause
raised heart rate, and so on. To address this issue, following the
strategy of the Foundational Model of Anatomy (Rosse and Mejino,
2003), we introduce ‘canonical’ emotion types, which represent the
standard, normal or prototypical instance of a particular emotion
type. As discussed in (Smith et al., 2011) for the case of pain, cano-
nical mental processes are congruent with their function, i.e. the
purpose for which humans evolved to have processes of that type.
Canonical fear thus involves an appraisal of dangerousness, while
non-canonical fear, such as that caused by flowers in persons suffe-
ring from anthophobia, may obtain even in cases where the person
is absolutely aware that the eliciting object is not dangerous, or that
the potential danger of the eliciting object does not warrant the level
of fear. ‘Canonical fear’ is thus a subtype of ‘fear’ in the ontology.
The canonical emotion type can then be augmented with what is
known about that emotion in terms of its components: canonical fear
is associated with appraisals of dangerousness that are appropriate
to the actual level of dangerousness of the situation or object elici-
tor, with action tendencies involving ‘fight or flight’ responses, with
physiological responses such as feeling cold or sweating, and with
characteristically fearful facial expressions. Each of these aspects
of the canonical emotion confer an evolutionary advantage on the
bearer, thus resulting in the development of the emotion in the way
that it has developed. Note that appraisals in our ontology need not
be strictly higher-order cognitive acts, that is, we allow for canoni-
cal fear also in animals such as primates and dogs (as described in
Hastings et al. (2011), see also Robinson (2005)).
1.2 BrainMap
BrainMap is a curated database of functional neuroimaging research
results, including functional and structural neuroimaging experi-
ments with coordinate-based results (Laird et al., 2005). Other such
databases include SumsDB (Van Essen et al., 2005) and the Brede
database (Nielsen, 2003). These databases can be contrasted with
automated approaches such as used by the NeuroSynth project (Yar-
koni et al., 2011), which harvests activation coordinates from the
literature and associates them with the most frequent words appe-
aring in the publication. This can lead to odd results, such as the
word ‘indeed’ being significantly associated with a brain region. We
have chosen to begin our annotation project with BrainMap as it is
at present the largest and most comprehensively annotated of these
functional imaging databases (Derrfuss and Mar, 2009).
The BrainMap database is curated from the primary literature.
The curation involves capturing the activation coordinate results of
neuroimaging experiments into the database together with the lite-
rature reference. BrainMap also provides supporting software and
tools for sharing and analysing neuroimaging results. The primary
objective of the database is to enable meta-analysis studies, and
BrainMap is one of the projects that is at the forefront of the effort
to share and redistribute neuroscientific research results as open
data. The goal is to promote greater reuse and reproducability of
the results of publicly funded neuroscience research.
BrainMap is supported by a classification of experimental paradi-
gms, the Cognitive Paradigm Ontology (CogPO) (Turner and Laird,
2012). Research paradigms in cognitive neuroscience are repeatedly
applied across multiple experiments, in order to render the expe-
rimental results comparable, just as assay designs are repeatedly
applied in chemical biology across multiple laboratories (Lane and
Nadel, 2002). CogPO includes representations of such paradigms,
including the stimuli presented (e.g. sounds, images), the instructi-
ons given (e.g. count to 10, try to discern the gender of a face in a
photograph), and the responses requested (e.g. press a specific but-
ton). It also includes some terminology referring to some emotion
types, e.g. ‘anger’ and ‘fear’, beneath ‘behavioural domain’.
Since the domain of CogPO is experiments, its authors have
attempted to align its upper levels to the Ontology of Biomedical
Investigations (OBI) (Brinkman et al., 2010). Despite this, CogPO
is currently not being developed following the principles of onto-
logical realism used by BFO and MF. One shortcoming, from this
perspective, of the CogPO classification in its current form, is that it
incorporates definitions for classes that are not true for all insta-
nces. For example, ‘response’ is defined as ‘The overt or covert
behavior which is elicited from the subject in an experimental con-
dition’. At the same time, various behaviors such as blinking and
swallowing are classified as ’overt response’, thus as instantiating
a type of response, yet many instances of such behaviors (indeed,
the majority of instances) do not take place as responses in any
kind of experiment. Another shortcoming is evident in that ‘beh-
avioral experimental paradigm’ is classified as a planned process
(i.e. an occurrent), yet the definition given for this term classi-
fies paradigms as descriptions: paradigms are said to “describe ...
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Fig. 1. An overview of the Emotion Ontology. Unlabelled arrows represent subsumption relations. For further detail, refer to (Hastings et al., 2011).
behavioral aspects of the experiment”. This indicates a confusion
between information and what it is about. The focus of CogPO
on experiments rather than on mental functioning, together with
the mentioned shortcomings, render our effort in annotation of
affective neuroscience information with the Emotion Ontology non-
redundant. Furthermore, the implicit assumption behind the design
of CogPO is that mental processes are not first-rate citizens in
the ontology since they are unobservable. Our ontological realism
admits mental processes as entities in their own right on the basis
of the fact that they are first-person experienceable. The annotation
of BrainMap with CogPO and with EM can, we believe, comple-
ment each other for the purposes of useful search and indexing of
functional neuroimaging data.
2 METHODS
2.1 Structure of ontology annotations
Annotations of gene products (such as proteins) to the Gene Onto-
logy types encode statements about the functions, processes and
locations of those gene products, based on various types of evi-
dence including experimental assays, scientific literature, textbook
knowledge and algorithmic prediction (Hill et al., 2008). The Gene
Ontology annotations are curated by multiple research groups inter-
nationally, but are amassed in the central Gene Ontology Annotation
(GOA) database (Camon et al., 2004).
An ontology annotation consists of three components: a
<database-record-id>, an annotation of <evidence> and
lastly the <ontology-entity> that the annotation is about.
Annotations are not themselves part of the ontology, but can be used
in conjunction with the ontology in analysis tasks. For the current
project, the <database-record-id> will be an identifier for
an entry in the BrainMap database, which links to the coordinate
data showing areas of statistically significant brain activation that
have been reported in the study corresponding to that identifier. The
<evidence> for the assertion will be the citation to the scienti-
fic literature that has been curated into that record in the database.
And the <ontology-entity> will refer to an appropriate entity
within the emotion ontology, as described further below.
2.2 Methods in affective neuroscience
As a preliminary survey to assess the feasibility of our approach,
we sampled 14 studies from the BrainMap database that investiga-
ted affective topics such as anger and fear, spanning a date range
from 1998 to 2009. In particular, we analysed the methods employed
in the experimental part of the research in order to evaluate which
representational unit (Smith et al., 2006) in the Emotion Ontology
would best correspond to what the subjects in the investigation were
undergoing at the time that their brains were being imaged. For
example, in one study (Morris et al., 1998) the subjects were asked
to determine the gender of the persons whose face was depicted,
while being shown faces with various degrees of angryness and hap-
piness and fearfulness depicted. The researchers were not interested
in the gender recognition - they tricked the subjects - but rather in
whether the angry/non-angry faces activate distinct brain parts. The
recognition of gender in pictures of facial expressions is chosen as
a task in order that the same task can be performed in the display
of emotional faces as in the display of control (neutral) faces, and
the resulting brain activity compared, with statistically significant
differences in activity then ascribed to the difference in conditions,
i.e. the emotional content of the picture rather than any other aspe-
cts. The facial expressions were generated at different intensities
by computerised ‘blending’ of different facial expressions represen-
ting neutral, happy and fearful faces. The images used were sourced
from a standard library of emotional facial expressions. One of the
findings of the paper was that the amygdala was statistically signi-
ficantly implicated in the processing of fearful facial expressions.
Another study (Onur et al., 2009) involved subjects viewing video
clips with emotional content (happy, neutral, fearful) while being
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exposed to either a placebo or to reboxetine, a norepinephrine reu-
ptake inhibitor. It was found that the active substance reboxetine was
able to induce an amygdala response bias towards fear signals that
did not appear in the subjects given the placebo.
Dominant paradigms for investigating neural correlates of emo-
tion processing included the display of visual stimuli such as emoti-
onal faces or video clips with emotional content, the presentation of
auditory stimuli with emotional content (such as screams or sounds
of disgust, as used in (Phillips et al., 1998)), and the use of personal
scripts to evoke memories of emotional experiences in subjects. A
particularly innovative paradigm used professional actors as the sub-
jects of the investigation, hypothesising that actors would be better
at evoking occurrent emotional responses within the experimental
context than ordinary subjects (Pelletier et al., 2003).
2.3 Strategy for creating annotations
Guided by the extensive annotation in BrainMap, for each combi-
nation of study design characteristics in which a different mental
phenomenon is induced in the study participants, we will create an
annotation template that specifies the association between that study
design and the best Emotion Ontology term with which to perform
the annotation. This will be the term that represents the mental pro-
cess type that is instantiated in the patient during the experiment. In
the case of one of the oldest and most widely used affective neuro-
science research paradigms, subjects are shown a display of pictures
containing emotional facial expressions. In this case, the mental pro-
cess that the subject is undergoing is visual perception of a static
image, and the object that is represented in the image being percei-
ved is a human face bearing an emotional facial expression. During
experimental designs in which the patient is being shown a video
with emotional content, the subject is undergoing visual perception
of a video, with the video as the relevant object. In both of these
cases, the relevant ontology type is MF:visual perception, and these
types may be specialized into subtypes for the case where the object
of the perception is static (a picture) or moving (a video).
There is an important further dimension of relevance for affe-
ctive neuroscience researchers which pertains to the representational
content of the image or video itself. This may be angry facial expres-
sions in some cases and fearful facial expressions in others; it may
show actors expressing disgust in some videos and loving interacti-
ons in others. These differences are very important for annotation
of research results in affective neuroscience, since it is known that
brain activity varies with differences in the representational content
of the object of perception – that is, the brain reacts differently to
pictures of angry faces compared to how it reacts to pictures of fear-
ful faces. However, the distinction is not significant in terms of the
underlying mental process to the extent that the ontology would be
augmented with terms such as perception of a picture of an angry
facial expression, since that would lead to a combinatorial explosion
in the number of ontology entities and ultimately an unmanagea-
ble hierarchy, a well-known problem with old-style classification
systems and controlled vocabularies (Rector et al., 1994).
Our strategy to accommodate annotation to these complex com-
posite redundant entities will be to introduce a separate module
extending the ontology with defined classes which are about ‘por-
tions of reality’ in a way similar to how the representational units
in a realism-based ontology denote universals (Smith and Ceusters,
2010). These defined classes will be described with full logical defi-
nitions specifying the mental process as well as the object, which
in the case of these perceptual processes are information artifacts of
different sorts (Ruttenburg et al., 2012). It can be convenient in some
application contexts to assign identifiers or names to such defined
classes for engineering purposes, such as for ease of storing onto-
logy annotations in this case, but they are not bona fide ontology
entities in their own right. We will use the Web Ontology Language
(OWL) for this effort, version 2 (Grau et al., 2008), which is sup-
ported by logic-based automated reasoners that are able to compute
the classification of such defined classes within the ontology proper.
The defined class labelled with perception of a picture of an angry
facial expression would be fully logically defined, according to the
conventions described in (Ceusters and Smith, 2010), as:
MF:visual perception and
has-participant some (
IAO:picture and is-about some
MFOEM:characteristic angry facial expression )
(Manchester syntax, Horridge and Patel-Schneider (2009).)
This composite term would be assigned as the annotation target in
the annotation template for the experimental design using pictures of
angry faces. Each annotation template can then be programmatically
applied multiple times to records in BrainMap. The results of this
process will form the EM annotations to BrainMap.
3 OPEN ISSUES
The design of suitable paradigms for the investigation of brain cor-
relates of mental processes is well known to be a challenging aspect
of cognitive and affective neuroscience, since the need to perform
experiments within the confines of brain imaging equipment means
that the full range of human experiences is not available to the
experimenter. The so-called ‘cognitive paradigms’, or characteristic
experimental designs, represent a proxy for the real research sub-
ject. Paradigms may be rather sophisticated: the use of professional
actors who are trained in self-induction of emotional states in order
to effect emotional performances is a case in point. Much work goes
into the development and validation – across multiple experiments –
of novel paradigms (Turner and Laird, 2012). But it is nevertheless
not straightforward to assert in an ontology annotation that a parti-
cular study result using a paradigm for studying fear that involves
perception of pictures of fearful faces represents brain activation for
canonical fear. Indeed, the reaction to viewing a picture of an angry
face may well be, appropriately, fear rather than anger. Our appro-
ach to annotation using templates based on the mental phenomena
induced in the study participant during the experiment therefore is
not sufficient to motivate an annotation for that study to the emotion
type that is, in some sense, the “subject” of the investigation. The
subjects may be perceiving angry faces but not experiencing anger,
even though anger is the subject of the investigation as intended by
the experimenter. Additional evidence may augment scientific kno-
wledge about the mental phenomena experienced by the subjects
to the extent that additional annotations are possible. For example,
there is some evidence that empathetic emotional reactions may har-
ness the same brain circuitry as the canonical emotions (Iacoboni,
2009). This, together with further evidence that, e.g., perception
of pictures of angry facial expressions elicits empathetic anger as
a response, would motivate creating an annotation to the ontology
entity empathetic anger, a subtype of anger, for those experiments
that involved perception of angry facial expressions. This matter is
currently an open question that will be the subject of future research.
4
Neuroscience and the Emotion Ontology
4 CONCLUSION
The increasing trend towards interdisciplinary research into all aspe-
cts of human functioning necessitates a new and broader focus on
what the research is about, transcending the historical boundaries
between disciplines. Realism-based ontology is designed specifi-
cally to facilitate this objective through categorising and describing
not only scientific investigations themselves but also the entities
in reality that are the subject of such investigations across diffe-
rent disciplines, in a way that allows research results to be unified
through data annotation and automated integration. This is par-
ticularly pertinent in the case of research into complex human
functioning such as the emotions, where the ordinary scientific
method of objectivity and reproducibility is difficult to secure. We
have described ongoing work to harness the Emotion Ontology in
the annotation of research results in affective neuroscience contai-
ned in the BrainMap database. The work we have described is in a
preliminary stage and much remains for future work, including crea-
ting the implementation for the annotation strategy described herein
and making the results available in a database.
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